The archaeological identification of individuals has been an important component of both processual attempts to characterize social organization by the treatment of individuals in mortuary ritual and more recent agency theory applications to studies of political economy and social change. Both approaches have been critiqued for failing to adequately define the individual, instead applying the Western concept of the individual to other societies. These shortcomings are shown to be part of a larger problem in social theory: the continuing polarization between individualism and holism. They point to the need for renewed interest in the anthropological analysis of the "person"-a socially shaped construct-in order to better understand social relationships and recognize the collective aspects of agency. A case study from the Classic Maya civilization illustrates how emphasis on the individual, as represented in mortuary events, artistic depictions, and texts, has resulted in interpretive difficulties that can be avoided by viewing these data from the perspective of the social collectivity from which personhood was derived. Maya corporate kin-based groups, known as "houses," were a major source of the social identities expressed in political action and represented in mortuary ritual and monumental imagery. © Agency theories in Europe and their counterparts in micro-macro sociology in America began to take shape by the 1970s (Ritzer and Gindoff 1994:6). These approaches have been labeled "methodological relationism," in which "neither social individuals nor social wholes can be explained without analyzing the social relationships between them" (Ritzer and Gindoff 1994:14). In this country, Giddens's (1979, 1984) structuration theory and Bourdieu's (1977) habitus have become popular, especially in archaeology, although there are competing theories [Archer's (1982[Archer's ( , 1996 morphogenesis and Sztompka's (1991, 1994b) social becoming among others; see Ritzer and Gindoff 1994:9 -10; Sztompka 1994a]. These theories typically posit a dynamic recursive relationship linking structure and agency. They contend that human action creates or reproduces "structure" (e.g., social structural relations, cultural categories, and customary practices) such that society is always in process. However, actors are constrained and conditioned to act, and to validate actions and their consequences, by their sociocultural circumstances. Structure is thus both shaping of and shaped by actors, who are both producers and products of structure (Sztompka 1994a:43).
In reaction to the overemphasis in holism on the social collectivity, the diverse theories labeled "methodological individualism" 1, * were formally developed beginning in the 1950s, in which explanations of all social phenomena are based on individuals and their actions (Lukes 1970: 77; Ritzer and Gindoff 1994:11) . Also grouped at this end of the polarity are interpretive sociology and phenomenol-constrained and conditioned to act, and to validate actions and their consequences, by their sociocultural circumstances. Structure is thus both shaping of and shaped by actors, who are both producers and products of structure (Sztompka 1994a:43).
Despite this advance over earlier theories, continuing problems in agency approaches have prevented the development of a satisfactory solution to the holism-individualism polarity. These include the lack of consistency in defining both structure and agency (Dobres and Robb 2000:8 -9; Ritzer and Gindoff 1994:9 -10) as well as in identifying actors or agents. Agents are often considered to be individuals, but sometimes agency is granted to taxonomic groups within society, such as a class, faction, age group, and gender, or to actual collectivities and institutions. In some perspectives, agency is a property limited only to dominant individuals or groups.
In archaeology, one result of the failure to adequately define structure and agency is that purported case studies in agency theory actually constitute a retreat back to methodological individualism (McCall 1999:16) , whose limitations agency theory is supposed to overcome. Agents are typically seen as dominant individuals acting in their own self-interests, which are frequently antithetical to society (Dobres and Robb 2000:9; cf. Sassaman 2000:149). Hodder (2000:23) recently suggested that for archaeologists to move beyond such "big man aggrandizer" models, they should concentrate on the microscale biographical analysis of individual "lived lives." This approach renders society as epiphenomenal as it leans even more toward the individualism pole.
In large part this inability to reconcile structure and agency, and the falling back on individual actions (with society or structure as mere backdrop), reflects the contemporary Western fascination with of groups and roles, but can be integrated within the contemporary perspective of society as a "system of contexts, or forms, of social action," when such relationships come into play and are open to negotiation, subversion, and transformation (Harrison 1985:128) . The "emergent" quality of the human subject (Morris 1985:724) becomes apparent in social interactions, as people act in the capacity of persons, thereby internalizing structure as they engage in actions to reproduce or transform it.
Recent calls in archaeology for the increased focus on the individual or the self in terms of "lived lives" and psychological constructions have emphasized three investigative domains. In decreasing order of archaeological accessibility, these are . All three of these domains come together in rare instances such as that of the Classic Maya civilization of southern Mexico and northern Central America, where textual information and imagery concerning certain high-ranking persons is being linked to actual skeletal remains of individuals found in royal tombs. As I will show, current interpretations that treat these Maya figures as historically documented agents have relied too greatly on the Western concept of the individual. The elaborate tombs have been assumed to reflect individual statuses and aspirations. Actions and events determined from portraiture or texts have been credited to the unique motivations of individual rulers. However, controversies and disagreements have arisen concerning how to interpret who did what and why. One reason for these disagreements is the explanatory poverty of the notion that Maya rulers acted as individuals whose motivations can only be conjectured. This article develops the proposal that much of this explicit archaeological evidence for "individuals" consists of purposeful representations of persons, whose identities, actions, and motivations were especially shaped by their membership in a social unit. For the Maya aristocracy in particular, this social unit was a multigeneration kin-based, hierarchically organized corporate group known as the "house."
In order to show the need for a rethinking of individuals in the past as "persons," as a means to bridge the structure-agency divide, I discuss how the earlier mortuary archaeology and later agency theory focused on individuals in order to investigate society and how both have been criticized for their failure to pay sufficient attention to the relationships between individuals and groups. The concept of "person" as devised by the French sociologist Mauss is then introduced to contrast personhood with individual and self, indicating how "individual" is a historically specific construct. Personhood, which recognizes the important social and collective component of one's identity, is not inconsistent with an actor-oriented or agency approach. On the contrary, it provides a critical sociocultural context for elucidating the recursive relationship between people and groups. The second half of the article provides the case study from the Classic period Maya to demonstrate how quite different interpretations will result pertaining to both grave treatment and symbolic evidence for agency when the contextually defined "person" is substituted for the generic "individual." The reconsideration of Maya actors as persons will ultimately entail a rethinking of Maya sociopolitical organization and history.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE INDIVIDUAL IN ARCHAEOLOGY

The Saxe-Binford Mortuary Program
Despite the by-now stereotyped view that processual archaeology considered ecomaterialist forces as determinants of cultural stasis or change-typifying the holistic paradigm-a number of the "new" archaeologists were interested in identifying individuals in prehistory. These attempts included recognizing the works of individual craftsmen (e.g., Hill and Gunn 1977), but a major impetus for this research was the classification of ancient societies into political (evolutionary) types, specifically egalitarian vs hierarchical, based on whether and how individuals were treated differently upon their deaths. While this type of analysis was occasionally done in the 1940s and 1950s (Sears 1961 :228-229), credit for this approach is most frequently given to Saxe (1970, 1971) and Binford (1971) 
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The basic assumption in their approach was that status differences in life were reflected in differential treatment upon death, such that burial variation, or its absence, would reflect the general structural features of a society (Saxe 1971 . In other words, social organization was considered the "primary determinant of variation in mortuary practices and burial form" (Carr 1995:106). Diagnostic differences in burial treatment include the expense of grave preparation, its location with respect to other features or defined spaces, the quantity and quality of grave furniture, and the position and orientation of the body.
Significantly, in order to clarify the social phenomenon reflected in burial treat-ment, both Saxe (1970) and Binford (1971) drew upon Goodenough's (1965) innovation of the terms "social identity" and "social persona," concepts which he differentiated from "status" as previously defined by Linton (1936:113) . Recognizing that all living individuals assume several social identities, and not all at the same time, Goodenough (1965:7) coined the term "social persona" for the composite of social identities selected as appropriate to any specific interaction. As used in mortuary analyses, the social persona was considered dependent on such common determinants of identity as age, sex, relative rank or position in a social unit, and affiliation of the deceased to other groups. Other archaeologists, however, used less well-defined concepts to indicate distinctions among grave treatments, including status (e.g., Peebles 1971; Rothschild 1979 Furthermore, there is the larger arena of mortuary ritual that must be considered, of which the grave is only one part. The context of mortuary practices extends far beyond the cemetery or burial place (Pearson 1993:226 -227) . Grave furniture may reference the burial ritual itself rather than the social status of the deceased (Pader 1982:58) . That which is associated with the body represents only a portion of a series of actions, which may serve to distort or mask social relations and identities rather than accurately reflect them (Hodder 1982:201) . Mortuary ritual often includes multiple stages of body processing and prolonged secondary funerary rites carried out in various locations, as first described in the classic study by Hertz (1960 Hertz ( [1907 Brown (1995), in a recent review of the Saxe-Binford program, suggested that the implicit focus in mortuary archaeology on identifying the status of individuals resulted from the relatively common occurrence of finding individual bodies in separate graves. This situation called for the application of a theory that would link individual variability to social organization. Thus, Goodenough's role theory was adopted to characterize the identities of those individuals while living (1995:11). Brown (1995:5) further observed that this intellectual framework reflects the contemporary experience of the archaeologists who devised it, namely, the common Euro-American practice of assigning social identities to individuals and interring them in separate graves.
Agency Approaches
The concern for the individual, now as an actor and not a reflection of social order, is an important component of contemporary archaeological theory (Hodder 1986:6 Giddens's approach differs significantly from that of other agency theorists, who tend to lean toward the side of structure, in that it embodies agency in human actors (Sztompka 1994a:38 -39). "Structure," idiosyncratically defined by Giddens as organizing principles or rules and resources (Ritzer and Gindoff 1994:10), is drawn upon by actors in their everyday lives, primarily as "practical knowledge" that is routine and taken for granted. Actors engage this knowledge and then reflect on the consequences of their actions as they understand them-for they may be at odds with intentions and expectations-thereby reproducing or changing the knowledge and conditions that originally enabled their actions (Giddens 1984: 2-4). Giddens thus proposed that [t] he constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize. Structure is not 'external' to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practice, it is in a certain sense more 'internal' than exterior to their activities in a Durkheimian sense. Structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling. This approach is apparent in several applications of agency theory to cultural evolution in prehispanic Mesoamerica, provided here as just one example.
5 Marcus and Flannery (1996:31) explicitly adopted the "essentially individualistic, self-interested, rational, and pragmatic" actor from interest theory for their model of the evolution of Zapotec civilization in Oaxaca. Using Giddens's concepts to account for the rise of social inequality in lowland Mesoamerica, Clark and Blake (1994:28) concluded that societal changes "result from the purposive action of individuals pursuing individual strategies and agendas within the structural constraints of their cultural system." Joyce and Winter (1996:33), in a similar study to account for the rise of social complexity in Oaxaca, also focused their interpretation on "individual-level behavioral strategies." How-ever, a more ambitious attempt by Blanton and colleagues (1996) to use agency theory to account for evolutionary change throughout Mesoamerican prehistory developed two contrasting political-economic strategies, one more individualistic and the other more collective. The "network" strategy was based on "individualcentered exchange relations" (Blanton et al. 1996:4), while the "corporate" strategy emphasized "a corporate solidarity of society as an integrated whole" (1996:6; see also Blanton 1998:149 -150).
Some of these studies were criticized for their failure to adequately develop the social context of human action. Joyce and Winter were accused of focusing "almost entirely upon autonomous, strategizing individuals" without concern for "[s]ocial roles such as gender, occupation, and kinship" (Brumfiel 1996:49) that shaped their identities, motivations, and options. Criado (1996:54) remarked that the emphasis on individual-centered strategies incorporates a model of agency only as it operates in postindustrial capitalist society. Thus, agency applications in archaeology are being faulted for presuming the universality of the Western notion of the individual, the same critique applied to the more holistic mortuary archaeology analyses. However, the individual as a unit of investigation has become even more emphasized in the paradigm shift in Anglo-American archaeology from determinist to rational actor approaches (Hodder 1986:6 -8).
This situation is not unexpected given that the "individual as a self-motivated agent" is fundamental to Euro-American social philosophy (Varenne 1984:281). In fact, the same criticism has been lodged against Giddens himself. His notion of the actor is derived from the Western concept of the individual and is never socioculturally constituted, only structurally situated (Pazos 1995:220) . Giddens "is simply uninterested in the characteristics of the noncapitalist formations and their subjectivity," and his concepts are thus difficult for anthropologists to utilize (Karp 1986: 134, 132). Structuration theory was developed in reference to "highly self-controlled individuals in advanced industrialized societies. But it is unable to show how this kind of individual came to develop in the first place: for Giddens, people have, apparently, always been the same since the dawn of history" (Kilminster 1991:101). Archaeologists who apply Giddens's model to the past should not be unduly criticized for failing to adequately define the actor and for implicitly assuming, as Giddens does, the contemporary Western concept of the individual.
In seeing the individual as a self-contained entity, Giddens's model of structuration-a process that depends upon interaction-has been faulted for its failure to consider the interdependence of actors: 
PERSON, PERSONNAGE, AND INDIVIDUAL
The idea of personhood has deep roots in anthropology, going back to the time when holistic approaches were dominant, and perhaps it has become somewhat neglected for that reason. In American anthropology theorists were concerned with defining concepts such as status, role, and social identity that later influenced the interpretations of Saxe and Binford. Linton Across the Atlantic this issue was tackled from a different angle by the French sociologist Mauss, a student of Emile Durkheim, in a 1938 essay (Mauss 1985) . Mauss examined empirical information from Zuni Pueblo, the Kwakiutl, and other peoples concerning their clan organization. He observed that each clan owned a set of names-really titles relating to the clan totem-that were distributed to clan members, who also assumed kinship positions that determined rank and authority, altogether forming a complex social classification system. He concluded, "on the one hand, the clan is conceived of as being made up of a certain number of persons, in reality of 'characters' (personnages). On the other hand, the role of all of them is really to act out, each insofar as it concerns him, the prefigured totality of the life of the clan" (1985:5) . Each personnage was a metonymic referent to that totality, taking its position with respect to all the others.
Independently, in the 1920s Franz Boas was having problems classifying the Kwakiutl local group (numayma) as a kind of clan. He ultimately suggested that The social persona is seen as an intersection of different qualitiesgender, age, birth order, kin groups of parents and affines, life experiences, and metaphysical essences-but personhood is something more. It is often encompassed by a title or name and materialized by insignia, totemic crests, or badges of office. They signify a category of being that may be coextensive with specific groups, property, and places. Personhood has rank or status implications vis-à -vis other persons and may also be associated with estate/caste/class, religion, ethnicity or ancestral group, and occupation. In Mauss's conception, specific "persons" exist in perpetuity. They preexist those humans who take on these identities, and at certain times it is possible that no human being will embody a specific personnage, which nevertheless exists as a category and thus as a means of interrelating, or potentially interrelating, people, ancestors, places, and things.
Personhood is not an automatic status and often conjoins separate components acquired over a lifetime or beyond. Such acquisition is the focus of a great deal of ritual as well as utilitarian effort and expenditure of resources, usually involving many people because their own identities are impacted by their relationships with others (LaFontaine 1985:132). Individuals who embody a specific person representing a unique constellation of features may, by dint of effort or luck, add to or subtract from those features. Biographies of persons are always changing, based on real "lived lives" and on how these are memorialized later. Conversely, some people in a society may never be recognized as having achieved full personhood, especially slaves and children (Fortes 1973:304ff; Kan 1989:64), so the coincidence of human being and person is not always complete.
Mauss's concept of personnage might seem to place too much emphasis on the social collectivity and on determinative social constructionism, of which the Durkheimian school has long been accused (Goody 1962:27). However, Fortes (1973:287), in reviewing Mauss's ideas, more explicitly linked "person" to "the perennial problem of how individual and society are interconnected in mutual regulation," which is the central problem in social theory. Fortes (1973:286) asked: "If personhood is socially generated and culturally defined, how then is it experienced by its bearer, the individual?" In response, he observed that the analyst must keep distinct the two aspects of personhood. Looking at it from the objective side, the distinctive qualities, capacities and roles with which society endows a person enable the person to be known to be, and also to show himself to be the person he is supposed to be. Looked at from the subjective side, it is a question of how the individual, as actor, knows himself to be-or not to be-the person he is expected to be in a given situation and status. The individual is not a passive bearer of personhood; he must appropriate the qualities and capacities, and the norms governing its expression to himself. (Fortes 1973:287) 6 As in practice or agency theory, the positions themselves, and the interdependent or oppositional relationships with others that they entail, do not exist except when "person" and "other" are defined in social interaction and in the reflection and discourse that follow from it. The actor does not simply play a role society has determined for him: "he has not simply put on the mask but has taken upon himself the identity it proclaims. For it is surely only by appropriating to himself his socially given personhood that he can exercise the qualities, the rights, the duties and the capacities that are distinctive of it" (Fortes 1973:311).
Incorporating In considering representations of status or social persona in mortuary treatment, and in judging the contexts and motivations for agency, archaeologists should be aware of the profound difference between "person" and "individual" as culturally specific constructions and that the individual in this sense did not exist for most of the past. They should further consider that "the practices by means of which actors construct their social world, and simultaneously their own selves and modes of being in the world, are . . . symbolically constituted and themselves symbolic processes" (Munn 1986:7). As I suggest in the following case study, what have often been seen as individualistic representations and actions may be better understood as social constructions that symbolically refer to "persons," whose identities, statuses, and motivations were shaped by their linkages to others in a collectivity. The interpretive differences that result from this perspective are significant enough to warrant serious consideration of the personhood of actors in the past.
MAYA REPRESENTATIONS OF PERSONHOOD
Representations of Maya Individuals
The archaeological concerns for identifying individuals in mortuary analyses and in other actor-centered contexts accessible through imagery and text have coincided in interpreting events of the Classic Maya civilization of southern Mesoamerica (ca. 250 -1000 A.D.; Fig. 1) . Data from the Late Classic site of Palenque, Mexico, are highlighted here, although a similar analysis could be carried out for any center with equivalent information on dynastic history and royal tomb occupation. I emphasize how the value implicitly assigned to the individual has resulted in some interpretive difficulties. An analytical shift away from the individual as a natural unit toward the relationships that are created and maintained among interacting persons may alleviate some of these difficulties and allow prehistorians to broaden their understandings of social dynamics.
The Maya are an interesting case for this purpose 7 because they created many human images juxtaposed with written texts which, since the pioneering work of Proskouriakoff (1960) 
Social Death
The arithmetic is not in doubt, and more sophisticated techniques for aging mature adults are now available (e.g., . Nevertheless, the operating assumption, overturned only in the face of irrefutable physical evidence, is that names on grave goods should coincide with the individual in the grave because it is believed that the deceased's status should be most prominently marked in mortuary contexts. A one-to-one correspondence is presumed between the skeletal remains and the symbolic references to social identity.
However, many Maya tombs were reentered and also reused, housing multiple bodies in differing states of articulation, so these graves cannot easily signify the status and identity of a single individual at a fixed point in time following immediately after death.
10 At Caracol, tombs served multiple uses and were not always the final resting place, as bodies were subjected to several stages of processing in different locales (Chase and Chase 1996: 76, 1998:311), and the same practice may explain empty tombs found elsewhere. In addition to the physical evidence for such secondary mortuary rituals, which sometimes involved the curation of body parts (Chase and Chase Funerary and commemorative rituals to "decompose" the social person simultaneously serve to reorganize the relationships of the survivors to one another to reaffirm order within the collectivity, as Hertz (1960) first observed. Kan (1989: 289) similarly noted for the Tlingit of Alaska: "To make the deceased into a valuable cultural resource, the ritual must separate his perishable and polluting attributes from the immortal and pure ones. The funeral begins this process, but time is needed for all the elements constituting his total social persona to be separated from each other, for the perishable and impure ones to be discarded, and for the immortal ones to be channeled back into the social order of the living." Thus, it is not suprising that a Maya Long Count date recorded for social death-possibly the muknal event-may be far removed from that of biological death. Among the Tlingit, for example, the dead body was considered "unfinished" until the memorial potlatch took place, which was necessary to "celebrate the end of a long process of transformation of the deceased's social persona" (Kan 1989:181-182) . In Indonesia, it is similarly the last prescribed exchange prestation that "signifies the end of a person" (Barraud 1990:224). Thus houses, which were named and whose social births and deaths were ritually marked, overlapped in these qualities with the people who occupied them. Moreover, despite the common presumption that monumental inscriptions were commissioned to extol the life events of rulers, Stuart (1998:375) has shown that they instead served more precisely to "record the activities surrounding the placement, creation, and activation of ritual things and places," specifically objects, monuments, and buildings, and that these "dedication events were among the most important events worthy of permanent record." In this sense, stone monuments erected in front of or within the buildings also served a commemorative function linking persons to those named places, reiterating their co-identities. Other objects also preserve a record of these ritual events. For example, a vessel in a dedicatory cache in an Early Classic palace structure at Tikal has an inscription "his house, Jaguar Paw, Ruler of Tikal, 9th Ruler." It makes explicit both the commemorative nature of the ritual in which the cache items were deposited, in association with the erection of the building (Jones 1991:111) as well as the linking of the named ruler to his "house."
The identification of persons with houses extends beyond even these examples, for the word "house" is used by the Maya to refer to their domestic groups apart from the structures. Among the modern Tzotzil Maya, sna (house) is the term for any named localized extended family group that maintains a separate identity which is objectified by a single house shrine and continuously enacted by group participation in dedication rituals (Vogt 1969:140). The equivalent social unit for the Chorti Maya is the otot (Wisdom  1940:248) . Similarly, the Postclassic Quiche Maya aristocracy were organized by membership in a nimha ("great house") (Carmack 1981:160). The Classic period inscriptions also provide evidence for prehispanic social identity as referrring to a "house" as a social group. In a Tamarindito, Guatemala, text the "house names" are provided for a ruler's mother and father, the woman being of the "flower house" and the man from the "maize house" (Houston 1998:521) . A widespread courtly title used by both males and females is read ah ch'ul na, "person of the holy house" (Houston 1993:130) . This title relates them to the ruler, ch'ul ahaw, "holy lord," the head of the royal ("holy") house in which those persons claimed membership.
The organization of Maya society into long-lived property-owning groups known as "houses" is not unusual but conforms to a widely distributed pattern also found in medieval Europe, whose aristrocracy formed noble houses to which commoners were attached ( 
Maya "Houses" and "Persons"
In the case of the Maya, several concrete expressions of personhood as derived from "house" affiliation are interpretable from the available evidence. They are manifested by the "house's" estate consisting of real and intangible property, by the strategic "language" of consanguineal kinship and affinity to create relationships that increase and perpetuate the estate over time, and by the maintenance of the estate over multiple generations.
Beginning with the "house" estate, among its important immaterial property is a set of names or titles, which may form a ranked classification system as the names are disbursed to certain "house" members (e.g., the descriptions of Zuni and Kwakiutl above; Fortes 1973:312; Kan 1989:70). These names are often attributed to real or legendary ancestors, and in assuming them, the living house members assume the ancestors' position or part of their identity, and thereby perpetuate that portion of the "house's" estate. Many modern Maya believe that the soul(s) of the dead are reincarnated in subsequently born family members given the same name, such that the two share in important aspects of their identities (Carlsen and Prechtel 1991:29; Thompson 1930:82). Thus, the ancestral spirits as well as the names should be considered immaterial "house" property that is curated across generations and reproduces the social unit.
Mauss ( 1998:102,  107) . In addition, inscriptions that preserve some of this history were written on the valuables themselves. These include the named stone stelae, which were often reerected, cached in buildings, or even mutilated as part of their resignification by later curators and also the fine costume ornaments recovered from building caches and tombs. For these latter objects, Joyce (2000) has demonstrated that many were deposited long after their initial creation and sometimes far away, as they were moved through exchange networks, such that their final disposition would have signified the history of a "house(s)," and not simply the discrete individual in the tomb. The Piedras Negras shell plaques described above fall into this category.
Mortuary ritual was a critical opportunity for "house" members to secure the inheritance of tangible and intangible property attached to the person of the deceased. The transfer of property rights is an act of social continuity in itself, but to transfer them, they must be actively claimed. Ethnographic examples reveal that it is common for the "house" valuables to be put on display at the deaths of important people. Barraud (1990:224) reported for the Kei Archipelago of Indonesia that "all jewels and valuables belonging to the deceased's house were exhibited and hung inside and outside his house in order to show both the greatness of his name and the grief of his family. For the last time, the deceased was identified and represented by his house." Kan (1989: 63) has similarly shown for the Tlingit that the commemorative potlatches to the dead were major occasions when ownership of property was reasserted, the histories of the heirlooms were recited, and the normally hidden objects were put on public display.
Heirloomed valuables This is in keeping with the ethnographically documented display of house history-as encapsulated by its most valuable heirlooms-at the death of a highranking member. We can suspect that accession to the head of the royal "house" may have called for a similar display, as in the case of the Cross Group tablets, as part of the final events of ending the interregnum brought about by the death of the previous ruler. This pattern suggests the likely commemorative purpose of the other tablets as well and indicates that they refer to a collective identity, rather than to the self-promotion of an individual.
The depictions of the deceased parents in these artworks is also significant, keeping in mind that these are symbolic representations. Many Maya inscriptions have been interpreted as naming the mother and father of an ego, usually the ruler. However, I suspect that the concern was not to identify a unique individual with regard to his parents, but to position his person with respect to other persons and "houses." In the case of the patrifilial Maya, one's own "house" was referenced through the naming of the "father" or the head of the "house" or even the "house" name, while the naming of the "mother" indicated the maternal or wife-giving "house," the source of "blood" and thus of life (Gillespie and Joyce 1997:199). The persons named as parents and the items they hold would thereby represent the contributions of their "houses" to the composite identity credited to the personage receiving them (1997:202). Indeed, the very names chosen to be displayed in the inscriptions and narrated in ritual events may indicate the qualities that were contributed to the person of the paramount. As one example, we've seen the appellative K'uk' applied to the founder of the king lists for both Palenque and Copan and to the mother of Pakal. In Yucatec Maya, k'uk' meant more than "quetzal bird." It also referred to the sprout, sucker, or shoot of trees and other plants, and the same word was applied to one's children and descendants ( 
CONCLUSION
This article has proposed that the socially constituted "person" may serve as one means to bridge the theoretical divide between "individualism" and "holism." It draws on an earlier literature that, with the proper perspective, can be updated to fit more contemporary practice or actororiented theories. In applying this concept to the prehispanic Maya, I have focused on how important aspects of personhood were derived from the organization of the Maya aristocracy into "houses," longlived property-owning groups, as can be determined from the archaeological and epigraphic evidence. I suggest that much of the surviving imagery at Palenque in particular served commemorative purposes in the sense that certain persons were actively remembered, claimed, and reshaped even long after the deaths of specific name-holders in order to enhance the identities and sociopolitical positions of the living within the framework of allied noble "houses" and their commoner clients. Similar manifestations of commemorative activities characterize other Maya centers, although the organizational principles by which royal persons were constructed and represented were not exactly the same, and new forms were innovated.
For example, the observation that female images and names are far more common in the western Maya area, along the Usumacinta River, than in the rest of the Maya lowlands, indicates more than a difference in gender relations at these various sites (cf. Haviland 1997:10). It also signals significant variation in the construction of Maya personhood, including the contributions of agnatic, uterine, and affinal "houses" and the gendered association of specific qualities that make up a person (e.g., Joyce 1996:186 -187). In addition to the greater emphasis on females, these western sites also reveal name repetition by members of the royal "house" and the imagery of bundled valuables. Perhaps these symbols and others form a specific historical complex that developed only in this part of the Maya lowlands. The likely implications of such variabilty for Maya political organization need to be further explored.
The elaborate material evidence of mortuary and commemorative rituals also indicates the importance and complexity of social identity as both created and deconstructed in a lengthy process that is not neatly confined to the biological events of birth and death. It signifies that identities were not isolable essences but were linked systematically to others-both persons and "houses," both the living and the dead-in the reproduction and transformation of society. There were other important interlocking components of Maya personhood and selfhood beyond kinship and "house" membership, notably gender, occupation or craft activities, and social estate ("class") ( Joyce 1993 Joyce , 1996 , and none of these should be treated in isola The metaphysical concepts of "self" highlighted in ethnopsychological approaches (e.g., Hill and Fischer 1999; Houston and Stuart 1998) also may serve to relate people to a totality beyond the self. In Mesoamerica, in addition to the "souls" that link people to their ancestors and related social collectivities, the ritual almanac (a 260-day "calendar") was a means of linking cosmic forces to human experience. Monaghan (1998:140) independently suggested that in Mesoamerica, "personhood is not something that is a necessary property of the individual, but is a status that inheres in a collectivity." He proposed that the Maya word for human being, vinik (cognate winik), which also means "20," is a reference to the 20 day names and associated destinies of the Mesoamerican ritual almanac by which the fate of every human is metaphysically entwined with specific cosmic forces. In assuming one of these 20 names based on the day of birth or baptism (social birth), each person therefore represents a necessary part of the larger cosmic system, such that "personhood is relational" (1998:140) . Monaghan (1998:140) observed that this makes sense given "the great emphasis we see in Mesoamerican societies on the maintenance of corporate rights and the equally strong emphasis on collective versus individual forms of worship."
Blanton and colleagues (1996:14) had called for more attention to be paid to prehistoric collectivities to understand the trajectories of Mesoamerican cultural evolution because most archaeologists have tended to concentrate on the individualistic processes and outcomes of the network strategy. The pendulum has shifted too far toward the "individual" pole in archaeology, and there is a need to model the bridging mechanisms between corporate groups and individuals, to explore the diversity and transformation of political economies. I suggest that we first consider how different strategies are best interpreted from the available evidence. The Classic Maya, considered to exemplify the network strategy because of the emphasis on pictures of named rulers and the costly enshrinement of royal ancestors, can be seen to evince the same collective construction of person and agency that one would expect to find with the corporate strategy. The emphasis on representations of named humans in Maya art cannot be taken as an emphasis on individual-centered activities and self-glorification. The pictures and texts may be references to persons, dependent for their identities on collectivities, namely the ruling and major subroyal "houses." The highly visible royal ancestral cults need not have entailed restrictions on group membership but may have had the opposite intent-to attract large numbers of clients lacking descent ties to the authority of a corporate unit by their participation in ritual, political, or economic activities, as has been described ethnographically (e.g., Boon 1977:63-65; Feeley-Harnik 1991).
A better approach to the unresolved issue of who built Pakal's tomb is first to consider that it was the work of his "house," whose members invested much of their own identity and prestige in his person and his memorialization after his death. The more interesting issue becomes investigating why it was that in some, but not all, Mesoamerican cultures since the time of the Formative period Olmecs (beginning ca. 1200 B.C.), powerful corporate groups were sometimes represented in artworks and mortuary contexts as "persons" embodied by individuals, with aspects of "house" identity literally constructed upon the human figure (Gillespie 1993 (Gillespie , 1999 . Depictions of rulers manipulating specific objects, wearing certain costume items, or located in association with powerful places-all of which signal the sacred qualities of their person-characterize the monumental art of the Olmecs and Maya, but are almost completely absent from the central Mexican highland civilizations of Teotihuacan and the Aztecs. This absence need not indicate the lack of sacred kingship and the embodiment of political power, however. Even for the Postclassic Aztecs, who exemplified the corporate strategy par excellence, the totality of the state was anthropomorphically referred to by the name (title) of the divine king Moteuczoma, as recorded in colonial documents (Gillespie 1998:245).
As for the majority of archaeological cultures that have left few such direct clues to social identities, it is nevertheless important in interpreting evidence for agency and status differences to recognize how "personhood" was enacted within a network of social groupings. A call for increased consideration for collectivities, by which individuals' lives are shaped through their interactions with others and their environment, is not a return to the Durkheimian assertion that people's be-haviors are determined by societal rules and roles. Indeed, applications of the "house" model have dealt precisely with the innovative and self-reflexive decisions made to maintain the house and increase its prestige (Gillespie 2000a). In particular, the conscious deployment of the enabling principles of kinship-considered a resource and utilized as a strategic language-is what Lé vi-Strauss (1987:180) emphasized in proposing the model of the "house" in contrast to the traditional notion of lineages, which is premised on the supposition that kinship rules had to be obeyed if negative consequences were to be avoided. The construction of persons, a constant process throughout (even beyond) people's lives, puts into practice the organizing principles or generative schemata of society. It is one means by which structure becomes internalized, even as its source lies outside of individual human beings. "Individual and collective are not mutually exclusive but are rather two sides of the same structural complex" (Fortes 1973:314), and it is their recursive relationship, dynamically enacted in practice, that produces society. 
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